The Subtle Shift Behind Manchester United’s Season: A Tactical Correction Hiding in Plain Sight
Rúben Amorim’s first full season at Manchester United has already taken on a strange tone. Not catastrophic, not impressive, but slightly confusing. There are weeks when you see flashes of resilience and quality, and then there are others where the team looks stuck between identities. The football has felt uneven, which is normal for a manager in transition, but it has also felt directionless at times.
It is only upon a closer inspection a quiet change can be noticed. The differences are substantial when you compare the first six matches with the five that followed. The results speak, of course, but the more interesting shift lies underneath, in the rhythms of their play and in the numbers that describe them.
While the first six games felt like watching United trying to fit into borrowed clothes, the next stretch has given the players profiles they are better suited for. It is not a tactical reinvention, there’s been self-correction.
1. The early weeks: Stressed possession, chaotic defending
The opening six matches produced two wins, one draw and three losses. The football felt like chaos in a poorly-constructed cage. United had a lot of the ball, close to 53.5 percent on average but possession never translated into dominance. Chaos ensued every time they lost the ball, with the team caught off their shape time and time again. It resulted in them conceding 1.83 goals per 90 despite facing only nine shots per game.
That combination usually points to something wrong in the defensive organisation, and the xGA agreed. United were giving up 1.53 expected goals per match from four shots on target, indicating that opponents were finding dangerous positions in central areas far too easily.
Further proof was found when the goalkeeper numbers reflected the lack of order as well. Bayndir, who started the first six games, had a save percentage of 46.5. Why is that alarming? Here’s the context - The lowest average save percentage in the current Premier League season is currently held by 20th-placed Wolves at 51.9% who have won a total of 2 points (0W, 2D, 9L) in 11 games. To add more daylight to these numbers, the league average save percentage currently stands at 68.2%, with no side other than Wolves registering numbers below 59%.
For United, this points to either bad goalkeeping or bad defensive organization - or as in United’s case - both. Let’s extrapolate Bayndir’s numbers individually to scope in on the problem.
PSxG or Post-Shot xG defines how likely a goalkeeper is to save a shot. It calculates the likelihood of a shot not turning into a goal based on the keeper’s ability to save it. Bayndir’s PSxG per 90 suggested he was performing below expectation at -0.26, with the average PSxG/90 for this season’s PL currently being -0.01 per 90 (important to note that the range extends from -0.41 to +0.23). However, it does not explain alone why United would rank well below the lowest numbers in their save percentage with Bayndir in goal.
The other reason for this numerical dissonance is the quality of shots arriving, or in other words - teams ranking up 0.16 xG/shot in their first six games (the league average currently being 0.11 xG/shot within a range of 0.9-0.14)
In simple words, United allowed clean, high-value attempts that left little margin for error. A shaky structure almost always pulls the keeper’s numbers down with it. Bayndir was below average with his performances but put together with the high-quality chances being gifted by a lack of defensive organization, and the numbers show United were living through chaos in their own half without the ball.
On the ball, United looked uncertain. They had enough of it, but they rarely shaped it into anything that felt stable. Despite holding possession over 50%, the pass accuracy hovered below 80, and it often came in the parts of the pitch where nothing dangerous followed. Moves required too many touches, too many small recoveries, and too many resets. The team reached shooting positions through effort more than structure. It wasn’t that they lacked ideas, just that the ideas never turned into something consistent.
These improvised movements also resulted in poor shot accuracy, as is often the case with teams who fail to arrive in the box with repeatable sequences. In other words, shot accuracy rises when teams repeat training drills in real-game situations, i.e. the more a team shoots from familiar positions and movements, the more likely they are to be accurate.
In United’s case, they registered a shot accuracy of 28.25% with the league average currently standing at 34.21. The poor football overall showed as United ended up with 0.83 goals per 90 minutes in those six games despite racking up the most shots by a team in the league back then.
Performing below average both with and without the ball while determining the style of play in a game by holding on to majority possession gave United that unwanted chaos in a cage.
2. The next five matches: Deeper defending, fewer risks, and more clarity
As the season moved into its next phase, United started behaving differently. The changes were subtle but the numbers and the eye tests began pointing in the same direction.
United defended deeper. Opponents were allowed to play more in front of them, which showed up immediately in the stats. The number of final-third passes against United rose from 23.5 to 31.4 per match. At first glance, that looks like a bad sign. In reality, it reflected a deliberate change. Amorim didn’t mind if teams reached the final third as long as the ball stayed outside the dangerous zones and their players behind the ball.
The results followed this approach. Opponents’ xGA dropped from 1.54 to 1.44 despite teams spending more time in United’s final third. Even though United were facing more shots/90 than before, rising from 9.3 to 14.2, the happy news was that the shots on target/90 stayed around 4. It showed in results as well as United’s goals conceded/90 dropped from 1.83 to 1.4.
This happens when you funnel opposition attacks into predictable areas. It also led to United conceding more possession, all in the effort to stop being cut through the middle. As their average possession dropped from 53.5 to 46.8, opposition teams got more shots in but the crucial change was that it came from worse positions, as indicated in the drop in xGA despite the rise in shots on goal..
The defensive behaviour shifted too. Interceptions/90 jumped from 6.5 to 9.2 per match, which was a natural consequence as United forced their opponents to push for risky passes in the small area of their defensive third. Overall tackles/90 fell from 19.2 to 17.2 indicating players were no longer straying out to individually win the ball but rather following a tactic of zonal defending, allowing them to win the ball back via interceptions rather than tackles.. That is what a basic mid-block usually looks like. Less chasing, more waiting. Fewer emergency tackles, more moments where the ball is picked off because the zone is controlled.
PPDA (Passes per Defensive Action) refers to how many passes a team waits for their opponents to make before executing a defensive action. With the mid-block implemented, United pulled back more and their PPDA/90 rose from 11.4 to 12.9. As mentioned, it suggested United were pressing less and prioritising shape over pressure. It is not glamorous football, but it is calmer. And after the chaos of the first few weeks, calm was an improvement.
3. Possession falls, precision drops, but stability grows
A major shift came with the ball. United’s possession/90 fell significantly, from 53.5 percent to 46.5 percent. That change alone tells a story. The team no longer tried to impose themselves high up the pitch. They accepted defending lower and attacking from deeper areas.
The passing data reveals the discomfort this brought. Pass completion dropped from 79.4 to 76.4 percent because they now had to go longer or wider after having invited the opponent into their half. As expected, long passes from the goalkeeper (passes more than 40 yards) nearly doubled, going from 15.8 to 31.4 attempts per 90. These aren’t the numbers of a team calmly playing out from the back. They belong to a team that has stopped pretending it can build reliably in tight zones right now.
Where the new system failed to improve however was their long pass accuracy. It fell from 55.3 to 47.3 percent per 90. Yet the slight rise in passes per possession/90, from 9.3 to 9.7, hints at something more interesting. United are still trying to stitch counters together, but they are not efficient at it yet. Accuracy of pass per possession/90 barely moved, going from 7.38 to 7.42, highlighting that the new system is not clinical. It points to a transitional attack that is being attempted but not quite polished at the moment.
Even so, the structure around the attack has become much more stable. The defensive organisation gives them something they lacked at the start: a predictable starting point for every possession.
4. The surprising part: United start scoring more
Here is where the story turns slightly. United’s attacking numbers dropped, but their goals increased. Their goals per match rose from 0.83 to 2.4 in this second stretch of games.
The explanation lies in the type of chances they are getting. They attempted fewer shot-creating actions/90, dropping from 28.1 to 21.8, but their shot on target/90 percentage jumped from 29.5 to 43.2. Fewer chances are coming, but finishers are getting a little more time and space due to opposition teams having to drop back every time in transitions against them.
This is the natural output of defending deeper. Once the team retreats and blocks space, opponents push their lines up and commit more players. That automatically creates transition lanes. And United’s front players thrive in transitions. The likes of Bruno Fernandes, Matheus Cunha, Bryan Mbuemo and Mason Mount have benefited from open grass more than structured buildup, pulling in the goals with more space to execute their individual brilliance.
The other factor is the opposition. Look at the opponents during this run: Sunderland, Liverpool, Brighton, Forest, and Spurs. All of them press high. All of them leave space behind. The new United approach, deliberately or accidentally, counters these teams perfectly.
The real story here is that United are not attacking better. They are attacking smarter because the conditions have become simpler. They don’t need to create possession-based attacks where more players need to work in tandem. They need to release one good ball into space and trust their attackers to use their natural ability in the final third.
5. Set pieces: The silent foundation
The other clutch factor has been set pieces. They have quietly carried United through these weeks. They scored four dead-ball goals in the first six matches and five in the next five, totalling nine so far. Some came from corners, some from short routines, some from rebounds after poor clearances.
This consistent output has quietly protected United during this shift. Even as open-play creation has dropped from 1.97 to 1.28 xG per 90, the team has remained a steady threat from dead-ball situations. To the point that, barring the Brighton game, United have produced six open play goals compared to nine set-piece goals this season.
This output matters, especially for a team that now spends longer without the ball and attacks in shorter bursts. When your open-play chance volume falls, you need another reliable stream of goals. For United, that stream has been set pieces.
6. What the season says about United right now
The change pertains more to alignment over classical improvement. The early-season football asked United to be something they are not yet. The recent football asks them to be something simpler and more natural.
They still cannot play out from the back cleanly. Their long-ball structure is inconsistent. Their counters are rushed. Their buildup is fragile. But they now have a defensive shape that protects those flaws and allows their strengths to breathe.
A mid-block helps the goalkeeper. It keeps the centre-backs in comfortable zones. It reduces the space between lines. And most importantly, it gives the attackers the one thing they can truly use in a team that is yet to learn to play together: space.
This is why the team feels more stable now. Not dramatically better, but more grounded. The numbers paint a picture of a side that has moved away from a complex identity into a simpler, more workable one.
7. The questions that remain
The biggest test will come against teams who refuse to press or teams who decide to counter this mid-block with less transitional phases. United’s next 10 fixtures are against opposition outside the top 6, barring one match against Aston Villa.
It is likely that several teams might sit deep and ask United to break them down through intricacy and accurate football. That is where this version of United may struggle. The long passes will not stretch the opposition. The counters will be far and few in between. The team might need patterns that are not yet built.
For now, though, the shift has brought clarity. Not a full solution, but a direction. A season that looked disjointed at the start now has a shape, even if it is a cautious one. Sometimes the hardest step for a team is admitting what it is not. United seem to have taken that step.
And that alone can be enough to steady a season. With the quality they have in their squad and Amorim’s prior experience of success with mid-blocks (at Sporting CP), United could become more precise now that stability appears to be lingering on the horizon.
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